Putting Process and Product Conceptions of Natural Selection and Genetic Drift to the Test by Pence, Charles H.
Putting Process and Product Conceptions of
Natural Selection and Genetic Dri to the Test
Charles H. Pence
Preprint of June 29, 2013 (do not cite)
Abstract
is paper argues for two claims. First, despite a persistent appearance to the contrary in
the philosophy of biology literature, the question of whether natural selection and genetic dri
should be dened as processes or as the products (or outcomes) of those processes is independent
of the question of whether natural selection and genetic dri are causally ecacious (the debate
between the ‘causalist’ and ‘statisticalist’ interpretations of evolutionary theory). Second, there
exist biological cases – cases which are quite prevalent in natural populations – that can be used
to drive apart process and product notions of selection and dri, and hence which could provide
evidence useful in determining which of these two classes of denitions is in line with biological
practice. Two cases presented here weigh in favor of process denitions, though this does not
suce to resolve the question.
1. Introduction
One of the most common debates in contemporary philosophical literature on the foundations
of evolutionary theory concerns whether natural selection and genetic dri are causal.is issue,
in turn, has touched on several other core questions in the philosophy of biology. Are we right to
describe selection, dri, mutation, migration, and so on as analogous to Newtonian forces, each of
which drives a population in a given direction? If we are, which of these should be considered part of
the “inertial” state (analogous to Newton’s rst law), and which should be considered “special” forces
(analogous to Newtonian gravitation and described by the second law)? What is the role of tness
1
in natural selection? If selection is causal, is tness causal as well? Or is tness merely a non-causal
property of organisms, tallied for biological convenience?
Broadly, two positions in this debate have solidied.e “causalist” picture, canonically stated
by Sober (1984), considers selection and dri to be causal processes, which in many cases can
protably be compared with Newtonian forces.e “statisticalist” interpretation, inaugurated by
Walsh et al. (2002) and Matthen and Ariew (2002), disagrees. On this interpretation, selection, dri,
and tness are all non-causal, statistical summaries of the genuinely causal events that occur at other
ontological levels (such as the individual, genetic, or biochemical).e analogy with Newtonian
forces, the statisticalists argue, cannot be sustained, particularly in the case of genetic dri (e.g.,
Walsh, 2007).
A survey of the relevant articles here would constitute a paper in its own right, so let’s narrow
the focus to one issue commonly discussed in the context of this debate. Are natural selection and
genetic dri to be dened as processes, or as the products or outcomes of those processes?
is question demands an answer in order to clarify our philosophical understanding of
evolutionary theory, for it has bearing on several core interpretive issues. Are selection and dri
objective, mind-independent features of the biological world, or are they merely useful theoretical
tools – that is, should we adopt a realist interpretation of these aspects of evolutionary theory? If
selection and dri are processes, this seems to lend credence to a realist interpretation, while a
product conception might more readily support an anti-realist reading.1 A process view of selection
and dri also entails that there is a metaphysical story to be told about the relationship between the
lower-level events which constitute selection and dri (births, deaths, matings, and the like), and the
1.e correlations mentioned in this paragraph are only that – there is nothing logically inconsistent about an anti-realist
process reading of selection and dri, for example. But the relationships between these positions indicates why resolving
this issue is so important for our philosophical approach to evolutionary theory.
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processes of selection and dri themselves (see, e.g., Shapiro and Sober, 2007). If selection and dri
are outcomes, then, as Walsh has argued, “in deploying themodern synthesis theory of evolution we
are not engaged in the project of articulating causes” (Walsh, 2007, p. 301), opening an interesting
philosophical avenue for the study of the nature of explanations that invoke selection and dri (see,
e.g., Matthen, 2009).
Finally, it is commonly held that the question of process versus product denitions of selection
and dri is central to the resolution of the causalist/statisticalist debate more broadly: that is, if
selection and dri are processes, then they are causal processes, and if they are outcomes, then
selection and dri are decidedly non-causal. On this view, the question about process and product
denitions is a proper part of the causalist/statisticalist debate.
It is this last claim that I will critique in this paper, by arguing for two theses. First, the question
of whether selection and dri should be dened as processes or products stands entirely separate
from that of whether selection and dri are causal – that is, the process/product question should not
be considered to be a mere part of the causalist/statisticalist debate, and the mistaken belief that it is
so has only obscured the issue. Second, there are biological cases – indeed, biological cases which
are commonplace in the natural world – that can be brought to bear to help us determine which of
process or product denitions of selection and dri passes the test of consistency with biological use.
I will describe two such cases here, each of which oers evidence in favor of process denitions, but
which are, taken together, still far from sucient to resolve the debate. More engagement with the
biological literature is required, and I hope to show one form that such engagement might take.
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2. Distinguishing Process and Product Denitions
We should begin by sketching, at least in general, the dierence between process and product concepts
of selection and dri.2ese are only outlines of some of the more common denitions – we will
return them in more detail below. Initially, though, we might characterize these positions as follows:
selection (process): a process of sampling that discriminates between individual organisms
based on dierences in tness (or merely any physical or causally-relevant dierences
whatsoever)
selection (product): a change (result, outcome) which is predicted (or explained, or both)
by dierences in the tnesses of traits
dri (process): a process of sampling that does not discriminate between individual
organisms
dri (product): a change (result, outcome) which is not predicted (or explained, or both)
by dierences in the tnesses of traits
As I mentioned above, it is oen taken that these classes of denitions can be straightforwardly
associated with sides in the causalist/statisticalist debate. It is not dicult to see why this would
be so.e process view of selection tends, indeed, to be most oen associated with the causalists.
Beatty denes natural selection as “a sampling process that discriminates, in particular, on the basis
of tness dierences” (1984, p. 190). Hodge denes it as “what is occurring when and only when there
is the nonfortuitous dierential reproduction of hereditary variants” (1987, p. 251). Bouchard and
Rosenberg describe it as “a contingent causal process in which individual tness dierences are the
causes and subsequent population dierences are the results” (2004, p. 710). Millstein argues that
natural selection is a process that acts on populations of organisms, on the basis of “dierences in
abilities to survive and reproduce” (2006, p. 643).3
2.is distinction has also been laid out by (among others) Matthen and Ariew (2009) and by Millstein (2002), who
describes it as a dierence between process and outcome notions of selection and dri.
3. For another instance of this view, see Filler (2009, pp. 774–775).
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Much the same is true of the process view of genetic dri, which is also associated with the
causalists. Beatty denes dri as “indiscriminate” sampling, on which “any physical dierences
between the entities in question are irrelevant to whether or not they are sampled” (1984, p. 189).
Millstein describes it as “an indiscriminate sampling process whereby physical dierences between
organisms are causally irrelevant to dierences in reproductive success” (2006, p. 640). Slightly
dierently, Bouchard and Rosenberg dene dri as occurring in cases where “the initial conditions
in the divergence [are] rare, improbable, and unrepresentative of the whole population of initial
conditions” (2004, p. 708).4
e product view of natural selection, on the other hand, is associated with the statisticalists.
Walsh has dened selection in several slightly dierent ways, always consistent with a product-based
view – as “the consequence [elsewhere, an ‘eect’] of the dierential rates of distinct causal processes
occurring within individuals” (2000, p. 141), as that which “explains the changes in the structure of a
population by appeal to dierences in trait tness” (2003, p. 289), and as “a change in population
structure predicted and explained by variation in trait tness” (2004, p. 351). Walsh, Lewens, and
Ariew describe selection as what occurs “only when the relative frequency of trait types changes
in a population as a consequence of dierences in the average tnesses of individuals in dierent
trait-classes” (2002, p. 464).Matthen andAriew describe it as “a statistical trend emerging from events
that occur in these ‘substrates’ [chromosomes, reproductive systems, body plans, developmental
sequences, etc.]” (2002, p. 68).5
And again, for genetic dri, we see the product view oen adopted by statisticalists. Walsh
denes dri as “a change in the structure of a population that is not predicted or explained by trait
4. For more instances of this process view of dri, see Hodge (1987), Millstein et al. (2009, p. 1) and Filler (2009,
pp. 774–775).
5. And yet more: see Brunnander (2006, p. 245), Walsh (2007, p. 282), Matthen (2009, p. 484), and Matthen and Ariew
(2009, p. 222).
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tnesses” (2004, p. 351), and elsewhere claims that “what it is for a change in relative trait frequencies
to constitute selection (or dri) is merely for it to be susceptible to a certain kind of statistical
description” (2007, p. 282). Matthen argues that genetic dri is best described as the “uncertainty
associated with” the “spread of possible outcomes” in a nite series of trials of a specic sort of
probabilistic process (2009, p. 484).
3. e Independence of the Process vs. Product Question
As a general rule, then, we can see that causalists argue from process denitions of dri and selection,
while statisticalists argue from product denitions. Why not, then, just refer to these as, respectively,
the causal and statistical notions of selection and dri, and consider the process/product question to
be an alternative way of phrasing the debate between causalists and statisticalists?ree arguments
may be oered that such an identication would be mistaken.
3.1. Mismatched Denitions
First, one prominent denition of genetic dri adopted by some causalist authors is clearly a product-
based notion, breaking the straightforward connection between causalists and process concepts.
Beatty notes that one of the few things uniting all the phenomena that are standardly described as
‘genetic dri’ is that they all involve “one or another biological form of random or indiscriminate
sampling, and consequent sampling error” (Beatty, 1992, p. 273). If genetic dri is thus simply dened
as this sampling error, then this is clearly an outcome-based notion of dri – and it is occasionally
adopted by causalist authors.6
6. For example, see Glymour (2006, p. 388), Barros (2008, p. 309), or the discussion of this denition in Forber and
Reisman (2007, pp. 622–623). A plausible explanation for the prevalence of this denition among causalist authors is
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3.2. Hybrid Denitions
Second, some authors – in particular, and most prominently, Brandon – have adopted hybrid deni-
tions of selection or dri that cut across the divide between process and product. While Brandon at
times refers to dri as “any deviation from the expected result due to sampling error” (2005, p. 158),
and several authors have interpreted him as therefore holding an outcome-based notion of genetic
dri (e.g., Pfeifer, 2005, p. 1136; Gildenhuys, 2009, p. 525), his position is in fact more nuanced.7
Immediately following the statement above connecting dri to product-level deviation from expecta-
tion, Brandon writes that “I label this approach ‘outcome-oriented’ to dierentiate it from Millstein’s
[process-based denition], but notice that it does refer to a process, viz. sampling, and so here dri is
dened in terms of both process and outcome” (Brandon, 2005, pp. 158–159, emph. added). Brandon
thus aims to dene dri as not merely a process, but a process that also generates a certain kind of
product. Only when we consider both, he argues, do we correctly encapsulate the phenomena of
dri.8
Despite adopting a hybrid denition of dri, Brandon’s position on the causalist/statisticalist
debate is no hybrid: he is most certainly a causalist (Brandon and Ramsey, 2007). Yet again, we have
a case which challenges the connection between causalist interpretations and process denitions of
selection and dri.
that it arises as a result of the misreading of Brandon that I describe below.
7. I thank Roberta Millstein for making Brandon’s view, and her opposition to it, much clearer.
8. I am not, notably, considering here the relationship of this hybrid denition to those oered in Brandon’s more recent
work (2006; McShea and Brandon, 2010).
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3.3. Orthogonal Questions
ird, and most importantly of all, whether one accepts process or product denitions of selection
and dri is logically independent of whether or not one takes them to be causal.ese are therefore two
entirely separate, orthogonal questions in the interpretation of evolutionary theory. It is worthwhile
to defend this claim in some detail, as the relatively strong alignment of causal/statistical with
process/product may make it rather surprising.9
Consider, as an exemplar of the process view of selection and dri, Hodge’s indiscriminate
and discriminate sampling processes, briey dened above. Indiscriminate sampling (i.e., sampling
which does not take tness dierences into account) can certainly be non-causal. Imagine shuing
a deck of cards and then spreading them out on a table in a line. Aer the fact, we choose the rst
ve or last ve cards, and call this a “sampling” event. Nothing about the card selection process
causally impinged on the cards. Indeed, the fact that a central element of the process was entirely
subjective seems to provide paradigmatic evidence for its being “non-causal” in this sense (a point
that is oen made by the statisticalists in the context of genetic dri). And discriminate sampling
(sampling which does involve tness dierences) could be non-causal as well – we simply choose
instead the rst ve red cards, or the last ve black cards (making color analogous to tness), and we
have discriminate, non-causal (again, subjective) sampling.
Of course, these processes could also be causal. Spread out the same deck of cards, then re a
very large dart with a suction cup on the end at the line. Say the suction cup isn’t perfectly sticky,
so it grabs only eighty percent of the cards it touches. Now we have two causal processes that have,
together, resulted in indiscriminate sampling – the ring of the dart gun, clearly causal, and the
9. Some language inWalsh (2007) seems to indicate that hemay have noticed this feature of these two classes of denitions,
though I cannot say for certain.
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precise physical details of the stickiness of the suction cup, also causal. We can make the sampling
discriminate by making some of the cards stickier than others – these sticky cards are more likely to
be picked up by the suction cup, so they will be overrepresented in our random sample.10
For the product view of natural selection, we need only consider the outcomes from the cases
already considered. In the non-causal, discriminate case above, if we choose the rst ve red cards,
then their being chosen is (partially) explained by (and would have, before-the-fact, been predicted
by) the fact that the cards are red (the higher “trait tness” of red against black).is, then, is a
non-causal product view of selection. And the example of the sticky cards and dart gun is causal
product-selection – the cards that are chosen are again (partially) explained and predicted by the
fact that some of them are sticky (the higher “trait tness” of sticky against non-sticky).
As a token example of the product view of genetic dri, the “sampling error” denition of dri
is also amenable to both causal and non-causal analysis. We have already seen a causal example –
the 80% success rate of our suction cup counts as a causal sort of sampling error. But it could be
non-causal as well, in a manner noted by Brandon and Carson (1996). Let’s say we spread out our
deck of cards and want to select one third of them. Of course, we can’t successfully grab 17 1/3 cards,
so we will by necessity be o by a fraction of a card.is seems to be a paradigm case of non-causal
sampling error – the “error” in our sample is merely a result of mathematics.11
is, then, establishes the rst of our two theses.e distinction between process and product
notions of genetic dri and natural selection has little to do with whether dri and selection are
10.is example is similar to one involving colored balls in an urn developed by Brandon and Carson (1996, pp. 321–325),
though they take this case as evidence that selection and dri are both causal and “stochastic” in their sense of the
term.e claim that selection and dri must be causal because of this example is refuted by the analysis here. Brandon
and Carson’s notion of stochasticity lies outside the scope of this article.
11. Again, this case is very similar to one that Brandon andCarson (1996) describe, although the conclusion they draw from
it – that genetic dri is “inevitable” in certain types of populations – only follows if one adopts their process/product
hybrid denition of genetic dri. A process-only notion of genetic dri, as we have seen, might or might not be
operating in such an instance.
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causal or statistical and, hence, the process/product question should be viewed as an independent
interpretive issue in the philosophy of biology, not as a proper part of the causalist/statisticalist
debate.12
4. Getting an Empirical Handle on Process and Product
It might be thought that only a priori philosophical work could adjudicate the question of which
class of denitions of selection and dri we should adopt.e argument would go something like
this: If we’ve done our jobs as philosophers of biology correctly, the extensions of scientic concepts
like natural selection and genetic dri are set by the scientists themselves – biologists, that is, are
in charge of telling us which cases count as natural selection and which count as genetic dri.e
intensions of these concepts would then vary, as philosophers work to determine the best conceptual
interpretation of these scientic theories, but it is unlikely that empirical evidence could weigh
strongly one way or the other.
In one sense, such an argument gets things right – in the biological literature, selection and
dri are not exclusively dened in terms of either processes or products. For the case of dri in
particular, Plutynski notes that “dri is spoken of interchangeably as eect and cause, pattern and
process” (2007, p. 157). Further, historically, she argues that the fact “[t]hat dri is referred to as both
eect and cause is not new,” dating back to foundational gures like Wright and Fisher (Plutynski,
2007, p. 161). Biological practice, then, cannot resolve our issue by a mere census.
12. In the limited context of genetic dri, Plutynski has stressed a similar point, indicting the debate over dri for
conating the “metaphysical” question of the existence of a population-level process of dri with the “epistemological”
question of the relative assessment of the importance of dri and selection (Plutynski, 2007, p. 162). I agree, and argue
further here that Plutynski’s metaphysical question can be disentangled into two separate questions: should we adopt
a process or product denition, and further, are dri and selection genuinely causal?
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But in another, more important sense, there is a way in which biological practice can be brought
to bear on the question of process versus product denitions of selection and dri. For while the
extensions of process and product denitions are nearly identical, as it turns out, they are not precisely
identical.ere do exist cases, then, where the extensions can be driven apart – and to this extent,
biological evidence can be made relevant. Let’s consider this, in turn, in conceptual terms and by
invoking examples.
4.1. e Abstract: Diering Extensions
First, then, let’s explore in more detail some of the process and product denitions on oer in the
literature, with an eye toward describing places where their extension can be seen to come apart in
the abstract.13 One strange feature of the argument in this section should be noted at the outset. We
are focusing here on the denitions of selection and dri deployed by both process and product
advocates in the debate – not on whether selection and dri should be conceived of as causes, for
reasons discussed in the last section.us, I will, for the moment, drop all reference to the causal or
non-causal character of these processes or products.14
Further, in what follows I will only introduce one process denition and one product denition
of each of natural selection and genetic dri.ere are, however, more than only these four denitions
found in the philosophical literature. Natural selection has at least one more process denition on
oer,15 and I am aware of at least two other process denitions of genetic dri16 and one other
13. If the reader is interested in cutting to the empirical chase, he or she may skip to section 4.2.
14. Relatedly, it is important to note that when I use the term ‘process’ in the following, I do not mean to imply that
such a process is causal – I intend only to refer to something like a temporally ordered sequence of states of a system.
Salmon, for example, notes that ‘process’ in this broad sense “can reasonably be regarded as a primitive concept that
can be made suciently clear in terms of examples and informal descriptions” (1994, p. 297).
15. Ramsey (2012) gestures at this view, which has yet to be described in detail; it ascribes natural selection to a probability
distribution over the possible paths of an evolving system, and is intended to be interpreted causally.
16. Bouchard and Rosenberg (2004) dene genetic dri as a population’s initial conditions being unrepresentative of the
full space of possible initial conditions, which is a property of the processes responsible for genetic dri. Gildenhuys
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product denition.17e important fact for us, however, is that process and product denitions can
be extensionally separated from one another, and that they can be so separated using plausible, even
commonplace, biological examples. Extending this analysis to further denitions of selection and
dri is a project for future work.
Case 1: Genetic Dri and Indiscriminate Sampling Processes. A tradition in process denitions
of genetic dri, beginning with Hodge (1987; see also Beatty, 1984; Millstein, 2006), denes dri as
an indiscriminate sampling process – sampling that does not discriminate based on tness dierences.
e most common product denition of dri, on the other hand, denes dri as any change in a
population that cannot be predicted or explained by variation in tness (Walsh, 2004, 2007; Matthen,
2009).
It is clear that, as expected, these two denitions will be extensionally equivalent in almost
all cases. Any process that does not discriminate on the basis of tness dierences (satisfying this
process denition of dri) will produce outcomes that do not need to be explained by reference to
tness dierences (satisfying this product denition). And if we have a change in a population that
does not require any reference to tness dierences for its explanation, then it is reasonable to assume
that this change was the result of some process (in the minimal sense described in footnote 14) that
itself does not take tness dierences into account. But the precise details are made more complicated
by the details of this product denition of dri, primarily because it requires us to demonstrate a
negative – that the change at work cannot be explained by reference to trait tness dierences.
As Millstein points out, “an indiscriminate sampling process can produce what looks like a
(2009) proposes a denition of NINPICs, a precise class of causal inuences which he claims includes all and only
those causes responsible for genetic dri.
17. As mentioned above, genetic dri is occasionally dened as any outcome which deviates from the outcome that we
expected to obtain (see Glymour, 2006; Barros, 2008).
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directed outcome (mimicking the most likely outcomes of a discriminate sampling process)” (2005,
p. 172).at is, it is possible that a population which is actually being altered by a process which
does not take tness dierences into account (i.e., which is undergoing genetic dri according to the
process denition) produces the same result that would have been expected were ospring produced
according to tness dierences (i.e., it is not undergoing genetic dri according to the product
denition).e product denition, then, might well lead us to infer that it was natural selection that
was responsible for the population change at issue. Walsh has precisely this characteristic in mind
when he notes that “[i]t is an unfortunate consequence of [the conjunction of these two denitions]
that dri-the-process [dri as indiscriminate sampling] causes selection-the-eect [the absence of
dri as outcomes not explained by trait tness]” (Walsh, 2010, p. 154).18
At a more general level, consider what it would take to prove that these two denitions of
genetic dri were extensionally equivalent. We take as a premise that a population has undergone a
change which cannot be explained or predicted by reference to tness dierences. But how can we
really infer further that the process responsible for that change did not discriminate at all with respect
to tness dierences? Perhaps the process has tness dierences as a core feature, but combines
these with a substantial stochastic element, altering the results signicantly enough that the best
explanation of the change no longer requires any reference to those tness dierences. Following
van Fraassen’s (1977) seminal work on the pragmatic dimensions of explanation, most philosophers
of science argue that explanations have a subjective element that the existence or non-existence of
causal processes does not. In such a case, we would have dri in the sense of this product denition
without dri in the sense of the process denition, a failure of extensional equivalence. In the next
18. Notably, no author in this debate simultaneously accepts both a product denition of selection and a process denition
of dri, so it is not clear who is the target of Walsh’s argument.
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section, we will see a biological example of precisely this kind of case.
Case 2: Process and Product Denitions of Natural Selection. Turn now to natural selection.
On the process side, natural selection has oen been dened as a process that discriminates between
organisms based upon dierences in their tness values (Hodge, 1987; Beatty, 1984; Millstein, 2006).
On the product side, it is any change in a population that can be explained by variation in tness
(Walsh, 2004, 2007; Matthen, 2009).
As in the case of the two denitions of dri that we considered above, these two denitions
will be extensionally equivalent in almost all cases – processes that discriminate based on tness will
require reference to tness dierences for their explanation. But, once again, there is the possibility
for a failure of equivalence introduced by the requirement not just that the process at issue is acting
on a population, but that the net population change be identical with that expected on the basis of trait
tness values. As emphasized by Shapiro and Sober (2007, pp. 254–255), any population in which
a tness-discriminating process is acting but which fails to produce the appropriate outcome will,
then, exhibit natural-selection-the-process without natural-selection-the-product. Again, in the next
section, we will see an instance of exactly such a real-world example.
4.2. e Concrete: Biological Case Studies
One might think that these theoretical cases in which the extensions of process and product deni-
tions of dri dier are, in some sense, marginal.ey lie at the fringes of our conceptual space as
philosophers of biology, and require precise circumstances in which the various factors of evolution
take on precise values or produce very specic outcomes. It turns out, however, that there is nothing
at all marginal about such cases. We can nd empirical examples of both of these kinds of cases –
14
and not merely examples of unusual circumstances, but instances that are highly prevalent in natural
populations.is means that it will be, at the very least, not at all dicult to nd empirical evidence
which could help us determine whether process or product denitions are more in concert with
biological practice.
Case 1: Fluctuating Selection. Begin with the rst conceptual examplementioned above, on which
genetic dri qua indiscriminate sampling process classies cases dierently from genetic dri qua
outcomes which can neither be explained nor predicted by dierences in trait tness.
One important open biological area of study invokes precisely this kind of case: uctuating
selection.19 To take just one instance of the importance of uctuating selection, Arnold et al. (2001)
discuss its role in the connection between the processes of microevolution and macroevolution.e
relative stability and homogeneity of selection coecients is, they note, “a convenient simplifying
assumption that can greatly facilitate theoretical work and data analysis,” but this assumption likely
does not hold for all kinds of traits. Life-history traits, in particular, are likely to “experience strong
selection that can uctuate with nearly any kind of ecological change” (Arnold et al., 2001, p. 21).
Notice how prevalent this means that uctuating selection is. Life-history traits are crucial to an
organism’s evolution, and include such features as brood or clutch size, the size of young at birth,
age at reproduction, investment of child-rearing eort, and the variance of all such traits in future
generations (Stearns, 1976; Mayo, 1980). To say that all traits such as these experience uctuating
selection is to recognize it as an incredibly important inuence throughout evolving populations.
Indeed, Bell even argues that, as a rule in all open populations, “selection is generally rather strong
and uctuates on all time-scales such that abrupt changes can occur over short periods of time and
19. My thanks to Roberta Millstein for bringing this example to my attention.
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gradual directional change occurs over long periods of time” (2010, p. 90; see also Leroi, 2000).20
Let’s return to the connection between uctuating selection and our two denitions of genetic
dri. Arnold et al. (2001) argue that life-history traits have something like the following selective
structure. First, their adaptive landscape is almost entirely directional – that is, it is at and sloped in
a single direction, as there is a uniform tness advantage to producing more ospring at an earlier
age.e lack of curvature on such an adaptive landscape means that there is no stability to be found,
no local optima at which a population may nd some resistance to small perturbations.is entails,
secondly, that changes in these traits’ distribution will be incredibly sensitive to the current direction
of selection pressure.ird, because selection for these traits uctuates dramatically according to
current ecological or environmental conditions, that direction of selective pressure will vary quite
dramatically over both space and time.
Any trait that behaves in this way constitutes an example of the sort of evolutionary change
that distinguishes our process and product notions of genetic dri. Because the tness landscape is
relatively at and slopes uniformly in a single direction, there is precisely one change in the population
that would be predicted by consulting present dierences in trait tness. Any change other than
this which does occur (and we have reason, based on the uctuation in ecological parameters, to
think that such change will be frequent) will be described as genetic dri by the product denition.
But according to the process denition, this is most emphatically not genetic dri at all – even
though environmental conditions uctuate wildly over time, these are selective processes which do
take tness into account.e evolution of life-history traits under uctuating selection therefore
constitutes a case which is (almost always) counted as genetic dri under a product denition, and is
20. For a historically and philosophically sophisticated discussion of one of the founding empirical examples of uctuating
selection, see Millstein (2008).
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not counted as genetic dri under a process denition. If we are to take the injunction of the biologist
seriously that this constitutes an instance of natural selection, then the product account seems to pass
the test, providing the solution for these kinds of empirical examples that lines up with biological
practice.
One objection could be raised here on behalf of the product conception of dri, and is worthy
of consideration in more detail. e discussion so far hasn’t considered the time-scale at which
descriptions of selection and dri should be deployed. Selection may well uctuate enough to “look
like” genetic dri over short time periods, but in the long run, as Bell noted above, it is plausible that
change in the general direction of the slope of the adaptive landscape will be realized, and hence, over
those longer time scales, product denitions will delineate selection and dri in line with empirical
practice.
It may well be the case that a change in time-scale provides the product theorist with one
way in which to respond to these cases of uctuating selection. But as many proponents of the
product denition of dri have been quick to point out, we should not think that there is a single
correct choice of time-scale or context for descriptions of selection and dri – this choice should
be set, at least in part, by explanatory context (Walsh et al., 2002, p. 466). If this is true, then it is
clearly a virtue of process denitions that they align with practice over both short- and long-term
explanations of evolutionary change. It seems dicult to establish a motivation for declaring the
long-term explanation to be the preferred one, as would be required to support product denitions
of selection and dri.
Case 2: Evolutionary Balancing Acts. Another important set of examples are those in which
process and product denitions are forced apart by precise cases of evolutionary balance. One
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example, as mentioned in the last section, are circumstances in which processes which are sensitive
to tness dierences (and constitute natural selection according to a process denition) do not
change the population outcome, and hence fail to produce natural selection on a product denition.
For genetic dri, we might consider cases in which one of the indiscriminate sampling processes
implicated in the product denition of genetic dri considered above are acting, but the action of
those processes fails to change the population outcomes from the expected result (i.e., fails to produce
genetic dri as product).
One obvious source of real-world examples of this sort can be found in mutation-selection
balance, originally described by Fisher (1922) and Haldane (1927). If the mutation rate is suciently
high, even quite deleterious alleles may be retained in a population, as mutation reintroduces them
faster than they can be eectively be removed by natural selection. While it is a commonplace to
claim that most mutations are deleterious, the extent to which this is true is surprising – Sawyer et al.
(2007) report that ≈95% of non-synonymous mutations in 91 genes of Drosophila melanogaster are
deleterious. It is thus clear that the impact of these deleterious changes on the evolutionary process
constitutes an important evolutionary inuence – albeit one that is dicult to estimate in natural
populations (Mitchell-Olds et al., 2007, pp. 853–854).
One particular case where a detailed argument may be marshaled, however, is that of the
persistence in human populations of genetic predispositions for mental illnesses that are both highly
heritable and extremely harmful. Keller and Miller (2006) collate data concerning the tness costs of
possessing such mutations, the correlation of such mental illnesses with parental age, inbreeding,
and other risk factors for mutation, and the estimated frequency of such alleles in the population,
and conclude on this basis that the only adequate explanation is that such alleles are maintained
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under (multiple-gene) mutation-selection balance.21 Schizophrenia, for example, is prevalent at a
rate of 1,000 individuals per 100,000 in the population, and has a high heritability value (h2 ≈ .80) –
that is, around 80% of observed variation in schizophrenia seems to trace to genetic dierences.
Why is mutation-selection balance interesting for us here? If such a balance holds for a given
allele, the common way of describing the scenario goes something like this. We have no change
over time in the frequency of the allele – hence, according to the product denition of selection,
no natural selection is acting. But when biologists argue that there is a strong inuence of natural
selection against such mutations (e.g., strong selection against schizophrenia in humans), they seem
to mean that there are processes in place that are strongly inuenced by the low tness of these
alleles – that is, that there is quite substantial natural selection in the sense of the process denition.
Mutation-selection balance, therefore, is both a signicant inuence in plausible empirical cases,
and constitutes an example in which these two denitions oer dierent characterizations of natural
selection. Once again, if we are to take biologists seriously in their claims that mutation-selection
balance does indeed involve natural selection, we have empirical cases that weigh in favor of the
process denition of natural selection.
I have oered here only two examples of real-world cases that underline the dierence between
these various denitions, and these only briey – more can (and should) doubtless be found. But it is
precisely in instances such as these, I claim, that protable engagement with the biological literature
can move this debate forward. In both cases, these empirical results support process over product
denitions of selection and dri.
Further, one characteristic of these two examples should strike philosophers of biology as
21. Mitchell-Olds et al. (2007, p. 853) argue, however, that some (though not extensive) data available from natural
populations of Drosophila and the common monkey-ower,Mimulus guttatus, are not compatible with simplistic
mutation-selection balance models, and that more complex models of the inuence of deleterious alleles need to be
developed.e empirical question thus remains open.
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troubling. As Imentioned above, these examples seem “marginal” with respect to the conceptual space
of our current denitions of selection and dri – they seem to require precise kinds of conditions
that would only be satisable in a small fraction of logically possible evolving systems. But as it
turns out, such cases are incredibly prevalent empirically. Fluctuating selection is a vitally important
evolutionary inuence, and mutation-selection balance is also likely to play a major role, though the
extent of its impact is more dicult to estimate. Considerations of length prevent me from pursuing
this line of thought here, but it is worth noting that this disconnect between the structure of our
conceptual space and the distribution of real-world empirical cases – i.e., cases which are conceptually
marginal but empirically common – may well indicate trouble with our overall understanding of
selection and dri.
5. Conclusions
I hope to have established two claims in this article. First, the question of whether natural selection
and genetic dri should be dened as processes or products is an independent research question
worthy of more intense scrutiny. While it is clearly aliated with the debate between causalists and
statisticalists, it is not a proper part of that debate (as it has been treated in the literature).
Second, and more importantly, there are a host of quite common empirical cases that can
help us discriminate between process and product denitions. In both cases that I have described
here, if we are to take seriously the biologist’s delineation of cases of selection and dri, then these
cases weigh in favor of denitions that make reference to the processes responsible for selection and
dri – whether those are exclusively process-based or hybrid denitions. For such an analysis to
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be conclusive, more examples need to be found and evaluated, and we cannot therefore declare the
issue closed here. But the evidence in favor of process denitions is strong.
Regardless of the end result of an appraisal of these empirical cases, however, it is clear that the
focus on the standard formulation of the causalist/statisticalist debate has served to obscure discussion
of the proper denitions of selection and dri.is is unfortunate for a variety of reasons. If biological
evidence can be applied to the process/product question, then this marks an important dierence
with the more metaphysically oriented questions concerning theories of causation oen broached in
the causalist/statisticalist debate. And nally, work toward a resolution of the process/product issue
on its own merits might provide the impetus needed to advance the otherwise seemingly intractable
debate on the causal potency of tness, selection, and dri.
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